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Posts tagged - MSSG

Monday, December 6, 2010

Two Days with BT’s Customers – The Best Security Boot Camp!

By Jill Knesek, Chief Security Officer, BT Global Services

A couple of weeks ago I had the privilege of attending the Managed Security Solutions Group annual customer conference.  We like to get our customers together once a year, not only to offer them an in-depth view of our product roadmap, but also to give them the opportunity to give us feedback on our services and also network with their peers.  As you can imagine, it’s a fascinating couple of days.

This year, I noticed there was one topic at the front of everyone’s mind: how to deal with allowing employees to bring their own devices to work.  How are we going to secure our employees’ iPads, iPhones and Androids?  My philosophy, which seems to be in line with those I talked with, is that we need to enable employees to use their own devices – it makes them more productive and agile workers who are quicker to respond to customer needs.  But, oh boy, does it introduce some headaches!

Rather than having fewer concerns on their horizons, 2011 seems to be brimming with new challenges for CISOs.  In addition to the challenge of managing non-homogenous devices, I suspect we’ll be seeing more cyber-weapons like Stuxnet and other targeted botnets.  While it is true that worms like Stuxnet are designed to do harm to a specific type of systems, we need to be vigilant because we don’t know what system might be next.  This time it was SCADA systems, but next time it could be financial trading systems, or transportation infrastructure.  Whatever it is, we can be certain that there will be a “next time” and that the speed at which exploits can be deployed is getting faster.

But of course, as CISOs and their teams are patching and defending, they also have to be demonstrating the effectiveness and value of their security and risk management programs to the board.  While I am buoyed by the fact that there are no longer any questions that the CISO should have a seat at the boardroom table, we’re still faced with the unenviable task of needing to justify spending money on an activity; that if you’re successful at it, nothing demonstrably bad happens.

I’m a big advocate of Risk Registers. and this year also enjoyed sharing how we tie our BT Security Scorecard to the business to ensure that our security strategy is properly aligned with BT’s business strategy.  From my perspective, being responsible for the security of a global enterprise, risk management needs to encompass human elements as well as the purely technical elements.  In putting together my organization’s risk register and security scorecard, I look at a full spectrum of risk — from the geo-political to the purely technical.  Human action and human intelligence are key factors in both creating and preventing risk.  If we’re just viewing risk management as something that an off-the-shelf box or piece of software can solve, then we’re missing the mark.

At the same time, I think some people are really over-thinking security.  Obviously we can’t secure every last detail of our employees’ work days, otherwise they’d not be able to get anything done and we’d soon be out of business.  Without a doubt, by enabling devices like the iPad and iPhone to be used at home and at work, we introduce certain risks – such as synching with iTunes which would enable sensitive data to be removed from work systems.  But the thing to remember is that employees can already do this with an old fashioned USB drive.

Security is a whole practice — and we should be using everything at our disposal to equip our employees to work with security top of mind.  From the moment we choose to hire an employee, we should be using background checks, vetting and a host of other tools to ensure we’re hiring good people and have robust layered protections on the back-end to ensure the business is protected if something does go wrong.  But thinking that using a device alone increases our risk is both over-thinking and oversimplifying the situation we face.

Thursday, February 11, 2010

When is Good, Good Enough?

By Toby Weir-Jones, Vice President, Product Development, Managed Security Solutions Group, BT Global Services

Brian Krebs recently shared a familiar-sounding story with a new twist.  Thieves, using valid credentials for PlainsCapital Bank’s online systems, initiated wire transfers from the account belonging to Hillary Machinery to international destinations.  Instead of the victim suing the bank, the bank is preemptively suing the victim. 

PlainsCapital is asking the District Court to certify that the bank’s security practices were commercially reasonable.  The bank’s key argument is that no attack on its systems took place; valid credentials were used, and it processed the wire transfers in good faith.  It therefore claims not to be at fault.  The victim, conversely, suggests that the registration-email tool should have been smart enough to flag source IPs which weren’t assigned to the victim’s network, and therefore the bank is indeed guilty of using inadequate security controls.

This is a real-world example of an idea we blogged about shortly after CyberMonday 2009 — making costs of online activity visible to the end customer.  The current status quo for attacks such as the one against Hillary generally result in the victim suing the bank, and the bank filing a claim against their insurance or otherwise paying out-of-pocket.  PlainsCapital is saying, in essence, that the remaining $200k is the victim’s cost to bear, and the finger-pointing regarding who performed the correct (or inadequate) risk management is taken off the table.  Hillary doesn’t need to enable online wire transfer services, the argument would go, and the choice to use it comes with an inherent cost.  Now, unusually, we are attributing a real-world figure to that abstract cost notion.

Without knowing how the courts will handle this particular case, the key discussion is around whether a service provider online is covered against customer claims if they have employed commercially reasonable controls for that service.  For example, it is no longer adequate simply to say you offer “authentication”; but the costs of managing a large number of tokens is still prohibitive for most systems, and the average customer will not pay an additional fee for the benefits of a third factor.  The industry has offered up a variety of soft tokens in response, and for systems protecting personal financial or credit information, this would seem to be a fair minimum standard of protection.  Customers should also demand some kind of reputable third-party validation on the quality of the implementation, since good controls are worthless if they are poorly setup.  An opportunity exists for a rating scheme which is both technically sophisticated and consumer-friendly.

In addition, customers should require some kind of disclosure about extranet, WAN, and other third-party connections between their primary vendor (online bank, insurance broker, mortgage company, etc.) and any other parties in the supply chain.  Obviously the same standards used for the vendor’s in-house infrastructure should be required to be met or exceeded by those third parties as well.  Banks (and compliance officers) will cringe at the complexities of performing annual audits to certify to this extent, but that is due primarily to cost objections required to do it properly.  If a vendor can’t make it work, it’s probably an indication of inadequate executive-level support as much as it might be too revealing about the poor state of the infrastructure. 

So the strategy appears to have two steps:  first, ensure you really do employ commercially reasonable (“best”) practices, and second, defend them proactively in court by seeking a legal opinion to validate they are robust.  The current mechanism of case law precedent won’t move fast enough to keep up with evolving best practices, but if a few courts do indeed issue judgments that it’s legally possible for a court to take the question of inadequacy off the table, the circumstances may create an unfortunate situation in which the courts are providing an opinion that was previously the domain of specialized assessment engagements and bleeding-edge specialists.

It’s not clear whether that’s better than having dueling experts fight one another in cross-examination, but I think most would agree that the court is unlikely to possess sufficient knowledge to evaluate corner cases reliably.  We therefore end up in a classic conundrum:  how to define the application of best practices with sufficient precision that you remove much of the interpretive spin of the exercise.  Vendors providing such assessments or opinions should be working with legal counsel to ensure the findings are both technically and legally unambiguous, framed in specific, tangible terms, and honest about the boundaries of coverage or testing exposure.  The audience, after all, may not be limited to internal technical company personnel, and the findings should be understandable to someone with a broader point of view.