Cyber War « SecureThinking

Posts tagged Cyber War

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

Part 2 — Cyberwar vs. cyberattack

By Jim Tiller, Vice President, Security Professional Services, North America, BT Global Services

Cyberwar is not your typical hacker attack. The difference — cyberwar is when a cyberattack is launched or condoned by a country, as opposed to being performed by a group, such as a terrorist group or cyber-criminals performing acts of vigilantism or some skewed version of patriotism.

A cyberwar is considered a “hack” – using the term very loosely – by a nation, government, and/or military to harm other countries. Granted, the lines are very blurry, especially when governments permit cyber-criminals to operate in their country or turn a blind eye, which can be construed as supporting the effort. But in general, cyberwar is considered a military action funded and driven by an established government.

Cyberwar is sometimes confused with the recent advent of counties using cyberwar-like tactics for various purposes – such as espionage or general disruption. For example, there is some evidence that the Chinese government was behind Project Aurora against Google and other companies. Or the formation of China’s GhostNet, where more than a thousand computers in more than a hundred countries were infected, with more than 30% considered high-valued targets, such as computers in embassies, international organization, news media and ministries of foreign affairs, among others. These are examples of the escalation to cyberwar — blatant attacks against digital assets around the world. It’s easy to see how these are examples of initial planning, testing of cyberweapons and information gathering.

Regardless, what we’re seeing today is not what I would call cyberwar, but more so cyberattacks that are testing the bounds of what is possible. In some discussions, I’ve referred to attacks of this nature as live-fire weapons testing.

Cyberwar is scary because of a few interesting attributes that are a little different from traditional warfare as we generally understand it, making it somewhat complicated:

There is a great deal of anonymity, generally referred to in cyberwar circles as the “attribution problem,” representing the deniability of the attacker. Although there are technologies that help to identify the source of a cyberattack, they do not provide indisputable evidence, at least not in the eyes of the international community. This attribute represents fundamental counterattack challenge. In conventional war, the source point of a fired weapon or the location of a threatening weapon system is rapidly identified and quickly targeted for destruction. In cyberwar, the attribution problem makes effective combatant identification nearly impossible. You may be able to determine what systems are attacking and from what location, but this is not enough to attribute to the real enemy.
Force multiplication uses resources that are not directly related to the attacking country. For example, in conventional warfare there are tanks, planes and other assets directly associated with the attacking force and are therefore quantifiable targets. In cyberwar, a country will likely take control of computing resources, such as hundreds of thousands or millions of personal computers around the world from which to launch an attack. This too makes a counterattack extraordinarily complex and fraught with risk. If not planned and executed with acute accuracy, a force could inadvertently take down a neutral country or ally.

These two simple and basic codependent features create an environment that is difficult to fully engage. For example, assume that the United States imposes additional strict sanctions against North Korea as a result of the recent sinking of a South Korean vessel; and in retaliation, the North Korean government wages a cyberattack against the American financial system. In doing so they utilize a vast network of commandeered computers in Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belarus to launch a well-planned attack through a complex web of command and control systems spread across a number of other counties.

Within minutes, the financial system begins to strain, automatic financial controls become engaged. Within the next 24 hours the system fails. The U.S. government has few options, if any, for an offensive. Resources are directed to defensive tactics to stem the tide, establish protective measures to thwart the attack as much as possible and start recovery processes. In short, the attacker is everywhere, including inside your environment.

You can’t simply start taking down systems because they may be owned by allies or may be your own systems working against you. Meanwhile, the impact to the U. S. is not unlike if a bomb were dropped in the middle of a major city. Therefore, in cyberwar there is a great deal of ambiguity and uncertainty, yet the level of impact is, on a very fundamental level, not all that different from an equally well-formed conventional attack.

This reality does impose a sense of fear that if truly understood and acknowledge throughout society would equal or even surpass levels of fear experienced during the cold war and the threat of nuclear annihilation. It’s ultimately based on the feeling of helplessness and the inability to respond. However, this is not entirely the situation that is evolving today.

In the coming weeks, we’ll continue on this topic. In the meantime, please share your thoughts on this important topic.

For more on Jim’s thoughts on cyberwar, see: Cyberwar is a reality, but what exactly is it?

Monday, June 21, 2010

Cyberwar is a reality, but what exactly is it?

By Jim Tiller, Vice President, Security Professional Services, North America, BT Global Services

You can’t pick up a paper, read a news article or scan a blog without something about cyberwar in there somewhere. Moreover, there are a number of books surfacing and, conservatively speaking, a great deal of activity in the government sector concerning cyberwar. While I’m working on a series of posts on this topic, I thought we should first try to define it.

In short, cyberwar is the use of technology to render some form of harm against an enemy. Suffice it to say that we’re not talking about your typical hacker trying to steal credit card numbers.

Cyberwar is technically more of a statement of condition as opposed to a specific act, such as a battle or attack. The term encompasses all the different forms of attacks, defenses and counter attacks that occur in the digital domain over time. You hear some in the government make statements such as, “we’re in a cyberwar,” referring to the vast number of attacks against government and private networks and systems from distant entities. These forms of attacks are on the rise, and the United States is clearly making the necessary political and military adjustments to address such threats (more on this in future posts).

On the other hand, you hear a more accurate representation of a cyberwar as a future condition where cyberattacks will have devastating results that are analogous to what we would see in conventional warfare. In many cases, experts will refer to situations where an attacking force would use “cyber weapons” to bring down the power grid, financial systems, communication networks and the like (e.g., critical infrastructure), rendering them unusable.

In this future, the difference between a cyberattack and a traditional attack is that the physical infrastructure remains generally intact. For example, a bomb blowing up a critical power station clearly hinders the ability to distribute electricity until it is rebuilt, consuming time and resources. Conversely, a cyberattack will render the deeply integrated computing systems temporarily useless, also hindering the ability to distribute electricity. Although the physical asset is unaffected in this scenario, the end result is very similar to a physical attack – electricity cannot be delivered to homes, businesses and other utilities for a period of time.

Of course, we have to acknowledge that a well-formed cyberattack can make computers perform dangerous acts that can manifest themselves as physical destruction. An example would be opening waste gates on a sewer system to dump raw sewage into the environment; or redirecting trains, placing them on a collision course; or channeling electricity in a manner that overloads systems, such as lines and transformers, causing them to explode or become completely inoperable; or disrupting air and ground controls, greatly increasing the potential for a devastating accident.

The list is very long. Think of all the computer controlled elements in our lives and about how the “logic” of their control could be manipulated to cause physical damage.

More importantly, we have to understand the condition and sensitivity of today’s major countries. During World War 2, it took a bomb to destroy an asset — such as a train, manufacturing plant, airfield, roads and bridges — to disrupt the stability of the enemy. However, today there is far more sensitivity to disruption.

Let’s go back to the power station attack example. If power was lost for an extended period of time, say two weeks, in key locations, such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, Atlanta, Boston, and the like, the United States would be brought to its knees. Financial systems would strain to a point of failure, emergency services would rapidly become overloaded, products couldn’t be delivered, trains wouldn’t run, hospitals would be overrun, impassable traffic would form and people – many of them – would die. Imagine if this occurred in the middle of winter or even summer – it would be a catastrophe. Therefore, a cyberattack against the power grid doesn’t have to physically destroy the power grid to cause massive damage and disruption because there is very little resilience in how our society functions. One critical aspect goes missing for a short period and the entire fabric begins to come apart.

This concept was demonstrated in the recent Icelandic volcano eruption that virtually halted all air traffic between the United States and Europe for weeks. This cost airlines millions, disrupted the travel plans of hundreds of thousands of people, and stopped the delivery of perishable resources, such as donated organs. The total cost in money and lives will never truly be known. Therefore, an attack against something like the power grid can cause mass disruption well beyond the targeted environment.

In the coming weeks, I will continue this series on cyberwar by writing about the “weaponization” of cyberspace and the cyber cold war. And then I will elaborate on the future “theater of war,” setting the foundation for sharing views of what World War 3 could look like.

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Has the Cyber War Threat been Exaggerated?

By Pete Russo, Senior Marketing Manager, BT Global Services

Almost every time you pick up a newspaper, you read how cybersecurity should be at the top of every company’s list of top concerns.

However, there are some who would say that this is up for debate. So, a debate is scheduled. Intelligence Squared U.S. (IQ²US) is presenting a debate entitled, “The Cyber War Threat Has Been Grossly Exaggerated,” on Tuesday, June 8, in Washington, D.C.

On one side will be Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and our very own Bruce Schneier, Chief Security Technology Officer, BT, and internationally renowned security author, who will debate in favor of the proposition.

On the other side of the debate will be Vice Admiral (ret.) Mike McConnell, former director of National Intelligence from 2007-2009, and Jonathan Zittrain, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and co-founder of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society.

Sponsored by Neustar, the debate will be in formal Oxford debate style. Neustar is sponsoring the event to help deepen understanding about cybersecurity needs.

If you want to see the debate live, visit the IQ²US website for tickets. If you can’t make it, look for an international broadcast on Bloomberg Television beginning on June 14 or listen for it on National Public Radio. Newsweek, IQ²US’s print and online media partner, will also feature coverage of this special debate in its magazine and on www.newsweek.com. Of course, we will also post content following the event on SecureThinking, so check back following the event.

Friday, February 5, 2010

Operation Aurora: The Dawn of a New Era of Network Attacks

By Toby Weir-Jones, Vice President – Product Development, Managed Security Solutions Group, BT Global Services

Over the past few weeks, there has been a great deal of coverage given to Google’s announcement that it has been the target of sophisticated network attacks from China. While many have suspected that western companies and government agencies have been attacked by the Chinese, Operation Aurora was confirmation that online espionage, if not cyber war, is prevalent.

It’s interesting to note that the purpose of the attacks was not to gain information for immediate profit, as is typically the case, but to keep tabs on the movement of information between individuals, groups, corporations, and government agencies without needing to filter content.

As has been well documented, Operation Aurora took advantage of a vulnerability in Microsoft’s IE platform. This continues a pattern of browser-based attacks originating in China against US networks, the most notable of which, until now, being Titan Rain back in 2003. The specific mode of attack is not new and is not really the story in this case; sadly we’re all familiar with proliferation of attacks against browsers and their plugins, the resulting malware, and ceaseless buffer overflow attacks against thoroughly-vetted products.

But what can companies do to combat these attacks and secure their operations? After all, not doing business in China isn’t really an option for most companies that are recovering from the economic downturn. And really, we shouldn’t single out China as the only source of suspicious firewall logs, nor should we assume that addresses originating in the US and Europe should be benign.

What can the CSO do, then, to protect the company and customers?

Product vendors will universally claim they could have detected the attacks because they would have seen it either in the raw network traffic (for NIDS products) or in the application data in memory (for AV and HIDS products). However, this level of detection relies on buffer overflow alerts that are so generic you’ll never know where the threat is coming from. In their defense, host products, such as AV and HIDS, can potentially detect the source of the attack as they are application aware. However, as is often the case, to use these host products effectively, the advanced application protections need to be enabled and not turned off—as many are—to avoid reporting false positives.

On the front-end what we advise our customers to do is to ensure they are monitoring the right devices, and logging is configured correctly. They also need to ensure that a well-documented and rehearsed incident response plan is in place in the event that a breach occurs.

In the SOC what we’re doing is much more time-consuming. Our analysts and engineers are relentlessly scouring every log, every security and non-security event, collecting every piece of contextual evidence and sending it back to the lab for analysis, comparing the results of a single customer network against our global customer base to document quickly and accurately that one host in a thousand within a monitored subnet is actually compromised.

Whether the motivation is fraud, spam, or espionage is technically immaterial because it has no bearing on finding infected hosts or revealing the methods of attack. What we rely on instead is dozens of combined years of experience in monitoring network security activity; we’re not limited to expertise on one or two technologies, we have extensive knowledge across numerous vendor platforms. Our CMAL and CBOT modules (first released in 2008) are great examples of advanced technology that solves real business problems, and they don’t simply offer up pretty reports about knee-jerk reactions performed by other devices.

We want to know where it’s coming from first, and then worry about the details behind what it’s doing. Security policies don’t distinguish between the details of buffer overflow attacks vs. brute-force — they focus on intent, so focusing efforts purely on signature-based detection can dangerously restrict your view.

This is the first post in a series about Aurora that we’re working on. Next up, Rob Jamison, our Manager of Network Intelligence, will offer up more insights into Aurora’s methods of propagation and detection.